[foaf-protocols] Lack of browser support
Story Henry
henry.story at bblfish.net
Sun Feb 28 22:12:52 CET 2010
On 28 Feb 2010, at 21:53, Peter Williams wrote:
> Henry Story wrote:
>
>> That is my question here:
>>
>> http://markmail.org/message/7loo7mmqtajaerpx
>
> If I were doing it, I (still) do exactly what I did 15 years ago when designing for the web/internet, when I stuffed a PKCS7-sealed secret in my directory entry for the asserting party to leverage. (Folks at GMD in Darmstadt did exactly the same thing, on what was a joint project also with INRIA). PKCS7 was not quite a well-established community standard at that point (unlike today, where it is commodity - in java and .net)
Ok, so we have the password and we sign it with the public key of the IDP.
That is what Akbar suggested earlier. And I agree this can be done.
> Now, once sealed for a particular IDP, the IDP essentially does PKCS7-unwrapping-procedures to learn (from the very act of being able to decrypt the stored digest-auth password) that it "is authorized" to validate the user (using digest auth). Incidentally, it also gets the necessary crypto material for digest-auth (that it can then admittedly abuse, to spoof the user). (1) policy-based control, then (2) material transfer, then (3) assurance/risk.
Only if the password is the same at some other site. Otherwise the spoofing won't work.
> If the user wants to authorize 9 IDPs to so act, there are 9 PKCS streams attached to the webid/foaf-card - each one targeting a given IDP by URI. More advanced use of PKCS7 sealing would allows one attached stream to target all 9 IDPs, encrypting for each under its public key the crypto material one wishes to transfer (the users digest-auth password, when all said and done). This is an simple example of group-keying (also used in S/MIME variant of PKCS7 for encrypted email), and cryptographers will argue all day about the merits and demerits of 100 such schemes. The way I state is typical military key management process (based on years of similar application to secure email). You get to 80%, for almost no effort.
But I completely agree. And I have never said this was not possible. This is possible to do, and relatively easy to imagine.
The problem I argue in the mail referenced above is not that it won't work, it's just that I don't see it catching on.
http://markmail.org/message/7loo7mmqtajaerpx
Why I don't see it catching on, is explained there, so I won't repeat myself.
But if people really think it can then by all means try it. You need to write an ontology with a few relations such as
[] a Password;
for <http://openid4.me/#openid>;
id me;
pkcs7 "123124DFDDD..." .
The you need to get people to write that out in their foaf file, and make sure they do it correctly.
If it catches on, I'll be amazed.
Henry
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